Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 76
Issue 2 Symposium on Philosophical Hermeneutics and Critical Legal Theory
Article 16
December 2000
The New Deal at Work
Peter Cappelli
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Recommended Citation
Peter Cappelli, The New Deal at Work, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1169(2000).
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THE NEW DEAL AT WORK
Peter Cappelli*
Introduction
Most observers of the corporate world believe that the traditional relationship between employer and employee is gone. But why the change occurred is not well understood, and what is replacing it often seems like a mystery.
What ended the traditional employment relationship is a variety of new management practices, driven by a changing environment, that essentially has brought the market—both the market for a ■ companys products and the labor market for its employees—directly inside the firm. And once inside, its logic quickly has become dominant, pushing out of its way the behavioral principles of reciprocity and long-term commitment, the internal promotion and development practices, and the concerns about equity that underlie the more traditional employment contract. The policies and practices that buffered the relationship with employees from outside pressures are gone. The end of employee loyalty to an organization, replaced by greater attachment to careers, is but one manifestation of this change.
Most attempts by companies to draw up a new contract represented wishful thinking as they sought simply to lower the expectations of employees by explicitly limiting the employers obligations on job security and career development (the dreaded 'employability” doctrine that pushes responsibility for careers onto employees), while assuming that most other aspects of the relationship, including high levels of employee performance, would continue. In fact, virtually every aspect of employment changes now that the market governs this relationship. From the difficulty that employers
* George W. Taylor Professor of Management, the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. The material in this Article is excerpted from Peter Cappelli, The New Deal at Work： Managing the Market-Driven Workforce (1999), and from a longer discussion of some of these issues in Peter Cappelli, Career Jobs Are Dead, 42 Cal. MGMT. Rev. 146 (1999).
have in recouping training investments to the substitutes that must be found for employee motivation and commitment, the new relationship dramatically changes how firms must manage their employees.
If the new employment relationship is not defined unilaterally by employer attempts to dictate a new deal, then what is it? It is tempting to think of the new relationship as something like free agency where legal contracts can be used to govern all aspects of the relationship, much as they do for professional sports or temporary help. There are some jobs where this model fits well, especially those where performance is easy to specify in advance and monitor after the fact. Jobs that can be contracted out, such as many positions in the world of information technology, fall into this category.
But for a great many positions, especially those in management, contracts struck in the market cannot define an employment relationship. At least some of the skills are unique to the employer and developed on the job, the tasks are interdependent with others or with systems in the organization, and performance is difficult to monitor accurately, all of which make contracts imperfect at best. Nor are managers professionals. Their work is governed by standards inside the organization, not professional codes, and their success is inextricably linked to that of their employer. The most important rewards for managers are still associated with promotion inside a company hierarchy.
The contradiction inherent in the new relationship comes from the fact that the nature of the work that most managers in particular perform does not lend itself to market-based relationships and contracts. It is much more suited to open-ended relationships where the obligations can be adjusted, performance can be observed, and rewards allocated accordingly as situations change. Some level of mutual commitment and trust to facilitate changing needs is inevitable as is the need to develop some unique skills inside the organization and to retain them indefinitely.
At the same time, the pressures from markets and the need to change organizations means that truly open-ended, long-term employment relationships are largely dead. The pressures to shed obsolete skills (compounded by the uncertainty of knowing which ones will be obsolete) and the problem of poaching skills from other employers make it difficult to main
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工作中的新政
引言
企业界的大多数观察人士认为，雇主与雇员之间的传统关系已经不复存在。但是，人们并没有很好地理解为什么会发生这种变化，而替代这种传统关系的方法似乎仍然是个谜。
结束传统雇佣关系的，是在不断变化的环境推动下出现的各种新的管理实践，这些做法实质上将市场--既有公司产品的市场，也有员工的劳动力市场--带入了公司内部。一旦进入内部，它的逻辑就迅速占据主导地位，推翻了互惠和长期承诺的行为原则，内部晋升和发展实践以及更为传统的雇佣合同基础上的对公平的关注。用来缓冲来自外部压力的员工关系的政策和做法已经消失。员工对组织的忠诚度下降，取而代之的是对职业的更大依恋，而这只是这种变化的一种体现。
公司大多数试图签订新合同的尝试都是一厢情愿的想法，因为他们试图通过明确减少雇主在工作保障和职业发展方面的义务来降低员工的期望（可怕的“可就业性”原则将职业责任推给了员工），同时假设该关系的大多数其他方面，包括高水平的员工绩效，将继续保持下去。实际上，由于市场主导着这种关系，实际上就业的各个方面都在发生变化。从公司难以收回培训投资，到必须找到替代品，以替代员工的动力和承诺，这种新建立的关系极大地改变了公司必须管理员工的方式。
如果新雇佣关系不是由雇主试图单方面决定达成新协议而定义的，那又是什么呢？人们很容易将这种新的关系视为自由代理关系，在这种关系中，人们可以使用法律合同来管理这个关系的各个方面，就像在职业运动或临时工中一样。在某些工作中，这种模式非常合适，尤其是那些易于预先指定性能并在事后进行监控的工作。可以外包的工作，例如信息技术领域的许多职位，都属于这一类。
但是对于很多职位，尤其是对管理职位而言，市场上签订的合同无法定义雇佣关系。至少其中一些技能是雇主独有的，并且是在工作中发展起来的，这些任务与其他人员或组织中的系统相互依赖，并且绩效难以准确监控，所有这些都至少使合同没有达到完善。管理人员也不是专业人员。他们的工作受组织内部标准的约束，而不是专业规范的约束，他们的成功与雇主的成功密不可分。对于管理者而言，最重要的回报仍然与公司内部的晋升相关。
新关系中固有的矛盾来自这样一个事实，即大多数管理人员特别执行的工作的性质并不适合于以市场为基础的关系和合同。它更适合于开放式关系，在这种关系中，义务可以调整，绩效可以观察，奖励随着情况的变化相应地分配。为了促进不断变化的需求，一定程度的相互承诺和信任是不可避免的，同样也需要在组织内部发展一些独特的技能并无限期地保留这些技能。
与此同时，来自市场的压力和对组织变革的需求意味着真正开放的长期雇佣关系已基本消失。淘汰过时技能的压力（加上不确定哪些技能将被淘汰的不确定性）以及其他雇主的偷猎技能问题，使得难以保持承诺和信任，在内部发展技能并保留重要技能。因此，这种新关系发展的决定性问题是，如何将市场模型移植到不适合它的职业上。
观察者有时会将传统的终身雇佣关系比作婚姻。以此类推，新的雇佣关系是终生的离婚后的再婚。这并不是简单的约会，因为这意味着关系过于随意和短期，以至于无法促进大多数组织中需要履行的职责。这更像是一夫一妻制，一系列紧密的关系受到期望的支配，因为这种期望需要使之起作用，但不可避免地不会持久。以及适应连续一夫一妻制生活的方式--始终对伴侣的选择权开放，避免通过婚前协议在彼此之间进行长期投资，并减少违反信托事项的问题（例如，没有大型人寿保险单将他们列为受益者）--与现代职场中给员工的职业建议没有什么不同。
婚姻和离婚的比喻作为一个隐喻是麻烦的，因为它通常暗示着一个破碎的承诺和对信托的破坏。被裁员的工人的创伤有时被比作离婚，恰恰是为了凸显雇主违背承诺的感觉。
但是，假设此时此刻，双方都怀着同样的期望建立了一种暂时的关系。有许多成功的关系涉及彼此的承诺，双方都知道这种关系不会长久。学生与大学之间的关系只是一个例子：双方都不仅知道这种关系将要结束，而且一般来说说，也知道这种关系会在什么时候结束。新的雇佣关系的不同之处在于，尽管双方都知道这种关系不可能永远持续下去，但它没有一个有限的终点，可以在需要时由任何一方单方面终止。
因此，新的雇佣关系是开放式关系与市场吸引力之间的一场不稳定的舞蹈。鉴于不确定的未来需求和其他机会，各方正在不断地就其承诺进行谈判。来自于关系外部的压力，特别是劳动力市场的压力，是现在塑造关系性质的重要力量。当劳动力市场疲软并且很难找到工作时，员工会变得更加忠于其雇主，并承担大部分重组成本；当劳动力市场紧缩时，员工的承诺会突然到来，雇主会变得更愿意对员工进行投资。
与任何变化一样，劳动力市场主导员工行为的新雇佣关系正在创造一批新的赢家和输家。在过去的二十年中的大多数时间里，记下分数很容易：雇主赢了，雇员输了，因为在这种新的，以市场为中介的关系中，疲软的劳动力市场使雇主可以将大部分重组成本推给雇员。而给员工的建议很简单：为了以防万一，尝试开发其他的工作选择，以备不时之需并做好疲惫不堪的心理准备。对于雇主而言，员工的管理是如此简单的一件事，以至于观察者严重质疑人力资源功能是否是必要的。
但是，一旦劳动力市场开始紧缩，问题就不再简单。当谈判能力变得更加平等时，在市场环境下谈判这种开放式关系的问题就变得非常棘手。尽管雇主可能并不拥有全部权力，但为应对这些谈判而建立雇佣关系并使其发挥作用的工作落在了他们身上，因为他们控制着这种关系可以适应的机制--工作的设计，薪酬结构，培训的提供以及就业的其他方面。哪些雇主会成为这种新关系的赢家，取决于他们适应的程度以及是否能够找到方法来管理员工的承诺，发展所需的技能并在更加开放和包容的强大的劳动力市场中留住这些员工。
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