Analysis of the Impact of Governance on Bank Performance: Case of Commercial Tunisian Banks
Chenini Hajeramp;Jarboui Anis
Received: 19 October 2015 /Accepted: 8 March 2016
The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract
Most studies that have investigated the relationship between governance and performance of banks were interested in the developed countries and to a lesser extent,the emerging countries.In this study, we tried to look from an empirical perspective, at the impact of governance through some internal mechanisms, on the performance of banks in a developing country like Tunisia.According to Kolsi and Ghorbel (2011), the effect of governance on the financial and stock market performance is still unknown.This result goes in the same direction as that of Adjaoud et al. (journal compilation 15,2007), leading to the lack of connection between governance and traditional performance measures.The empirical analysis is performed on a sample of eight Tunisian commercial banks listed on the Stock Exchange over the period 2000–2011;we can conclude that there is no standard governance structure and that each bank should adopt the appropriate governance structure to improve the performance of the financial market, in general, and the banking market, in particular.The verification of this central assumption in the Tunisian context, therefore, is the fundamental contribution of thisstudy. It is for this reason that the results we, even modest, have achieved allow enriching the issue of the impact of some governance variables varying according to the chosen performance measurement, which is a neglected theme in the Tunisian context.
Keywords Performance banks;Governance banks;Efficiency;Governance mechanisms; Data envelopment analysis(DEA);Board of directors;Ownership structure
- Introduction
The appearance of the theme of governance is assigned to the debate opened by Berle and Means (1932) who were executed after the 1929 crisis.The problem of governance for these two authors was born from the division of the property function into two functions: an adjudicative one and a control one.This quarter, due to a failure of the control systems which are responsible for key management discipline, would have caused deterioration in the performance and counting of shareholders.The problem of governance is thus part of a mind control officers.
In this due, financial institutions, mainly banks, are especially concerned with corporate governance. In fact, banks are characterized by distinct agency problems and are relatively supported as other nonregulated businesses.These agency problems are created mainly by the asymmetry of existing information between all stakeholders in the banking sector.
Previous researches are multiplied to give the determinants of an effective governance system.Andreacute; and Schiehll (2004) argue that the literature reveals an association between the governance systems and business performance, but empirical research on this association did not provide conclusive results.In short, the different results show that the impact of governance mechanisms on performance remains an empirical question to explore.The ambiguity, both theoretical and empirical, prompted us to clarify this association for the Tunisian case.
Thus, our problem is to what extent the governance is important in achieving performance for banks in a developing country like Tunisia.The structure of this article is as follows: the first part provides a brief overview on bank performance and the measurement methods.The second part presents a descriptive analysis of bank governance. Finally, in the third part, we test the existence of a relationship between bank governance and performance.
- Literature Review
2.1 Bank Performance
2.1.1 The Concept of Banking Performance
In general, the performance is defined as the achievement of the objectives set forth by the firm (the bank) within the agreed time and with minimal costs while using the available resources.For example, for a manager, the performance may be profitability or competitiveness for the company or for the employee, the work environment, or the quality of services rendered for the customer.The multiplicity of possible approaches brought out a concept determined due to the diversity of groups that make up the organization.
2.1.2 Measurement of Bank Performance
The measure of performance is, as any function of control and management, a way to guide the behavior of the actors of an organization and motivate them.There fare,improvement cannot take place unless there is a way to get feedback on performance,because measure is the first step to improvement.
There are two basic types of measurement of bank performance. The first type is related to the results (the second one financial measure) focuses on the determinants of the results (nonfinancial measures) such as quality, flexibility, use of resources, and innovation.This stipulates that, as part of performance, measurement can be established around the concepts of outcomes and determinants.
Infact,we notice that there is an evolution of performance models on financial measures.Therefore,many studies have used criteria such as profitability ratios(return on assets(ROA);return on equity(ROE)) and cost-efficiency for measuring bank performance.
2.2 Profitability Ratios as a Measure of Bank Performance
Several authors used the ROA and ROE measurement to designate corporate financial performance.
2.2.1 Return on Assets
This variable represents the rentability of funds employed and expresses the ability of these funds to create a cert
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附录A 译文
治理对银行业绩影响分析——以商业突尼斯银行为例
Chenini Hajeramp;Jarboui Anis
收到日期:2015年10月19日/接受日期:2016年3月8日
作者于2016年将本文发表在Springerlink.com开放访问
摘 要
大多数调查银行治理与业绩之间关系的研究都对发达国家感兴趣,其次是新兴国家。在这项研究中,我们试图从经验角度来看待通过内部机制进行治理对突尼斯等发展中国家银行业绩的影响。对2000年至2011年间在联合交易所上市的八家突尼斯商业银行进行了实证分析,我们可以得出结论:没有标准的治理结构,各银行应采用适当的治理结构来改善金融市场的表现,尤其是银行市场的表现。因此,突尼斯这一核心假设的核实是本研究的根本贡献。正是由于这个原因,我们所取得的成果,即使是微不足道的成就,也可以丰富一些治理变量的影响问题,这些变数是根据所选择的业绩衡量标准而变化的,这在突尼斯背景下是一个被忽视的主题。
关键词 银行绩效;银行治理;效率;治理机制
- 介绍
治理主题的出现被分配到由1929年危机后执行的Berle和Means(1932)开启的辩论。这两位作者的治理问题源于财产职能分为两个职能:裁判职能和控制职能。本季度,由于负责关键管理纪律的控制系统的失败,将导致业绩和股东数量的恶化。因此,治理问题是精神控制官员的一部分。
因此,我们的问题在于,在突尼斯这样的发展中国家,银行在如何取得业绩方面的治理至关重要。本文的结构如下:第一部分简要介绍了银行绩效和测量方法。第二部分对银行治理进行了描述性分析。 最后,在第三部分中,我们检验了银行治理与业绩之间存在的关系。
- 突尼斯商业银行的实施
2.1 模型规范和变量选择
我们的实证分析涉及突尼斯商业银行2000至2011年间效率得分的计算。所使用的样本包括在证券交易所上市的八家存款银行,即阿门银行,阿拉伯突尼斯银行,突尼斯阿拉伯国际银行,国家农业银行,突尼斯银行, 突尼斯银行公司(STB),国际银行联盟(UIB)和住房银行(BH)。
此外,零售银行集团是突尼斯经济融资的最大分支。因此,选定的样本可以提供关于治理对绩效的影响的想法。所使用的财务数据来自年度银行活动报告,突尼斯银行专业协会的年度报告,并指导突尼斯证券交易所。
2.2 结果
应用DEA方法计算反映治理体系良好实践的效率得分。更具体地说,DEA方法的基本思想是确定代表最佳实践的边界:最大化输出的输入。关于DEA 2.1软件规模收益不变的情况,应用DEA后达到的结果如表1所示。
2.2.1 分析每家银行的效率得分变化(2000-2011)
表1显示了在观察期(2000 - 2011年)期间突尼斯商业银行的平均技术效率为99.3%。这使我们得出结论,技术效率低下7%(1至-0993)。技术效率的平均总体水平为99.3%意味着所研究的样本非常有效。实际上,一家高效的银行将治理实践相结合,可以最大限度地提高绩效,因此可以最大限度地降低代理成本。
表1 银行的效率得分(2000-2011)
银行 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
2003 |
2004 |
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2011 |
平均 |
AB |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0.947 |
1 |
1 |
0.99 |
1 |
0.995 |
ATB |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0.927 |
1 |
0.994 |
BH |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0.991 |
1 |
0.996 |
1 |
0.857 |
1 |
1 |
0.954 |
1 |
0.983 |
BIAT |
0.983 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0.993 |
1 |
1 |
0.995 |
1 |
1 |
0.998 |
BNA |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0.999 |
1 |
1 |
0.986 |
1 |
1 |
0.987 |
1 |
1 |
0.998 |
BT |
1 |
1 |
0.96 |
1 |
0.979 |
0.984 |
0.965 |
1 |
1 |
0.981 |
1 |
0.946 |
0.985 |
STB |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0.963 |
1 |
0.999 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0.997 |
UIB |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0.968 |
1 |
1 |
0.999 |
0.997 |
平均 |
0.998 |
1 |
0.995 |
0.999 |
0.993 |
0.997 |
0.993 |
0.976 |
0.996 |
0.995 |
0.984 |
0.993 |
0.993 |
2.2.2 关于治理变量
百分之五十的样本观察数据是银行董事会主席同时是首席执行官的银行,而在剩下的50%中,经理和控制人员的职能是分开的。外方董事在董事会中的比例在0%到58%之间,这是20.7%的平均值。
在董事会任职的代表政府的董事比例平均约为12.4%,但是这个百分比在0到72%之间变化。代表公共机构董事的比例平均为16.3%,这一份额在公共银行中可以达到60%,但在私人银行中没有剩余。董事会规模在7至12人之间,平均为11.16%的董事。
2.2.3 关于性能变量
资产回报率:样本银行的这一比率的平均值为0.9%,因为它知道在最高0.32%和最低0%之间波动。
净资产收益率:这一比率的平均值平均为9.4%,知道最大值为2.3%,最小值为0%。
表2 变量的描述性统计
Variables |
Average |
Maximum |
Minimum |
Combine the functions of CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors |
0.5 |
1 |
0 |
Size of the board |
11.167 |
12 |
7 |
Percentage of foreign directors |
0.207 |
0.58 |
0 |
Percentage directors representing the STATE |
0.124 |
0.72 |
0 |
Percentage directors representing public institutions |
0.163 |
0.6 |
0 |
Log (actif): size |
7.979 |
8.782 |
5.633 |
ROA |
0.009 |
0.032 |
0 |
ROE |
0.094 |
0.23 |
0 |
注:描述性研究是对72个观察结果进行的
- 结论
结果显示,绩效与公共机构代表,国外,二元管理和银行规模之间没有显著的相对关系。然而,这种关系与董事会和国家代表的规模有很大关系。同样,作为银行业绩的内部衡量标准,变量效率之间的相关性得出了治理变量缺乏显着影响的结论。
它表明,治理对突尼斯商业银行业绩的影响呈现出不同的结果。这种差异与这些银行的几个特点,除了它们的大小,董事会的规模,外国董事的比例,政府和公共机构的代表,二元性的方向,尤其是
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