Taxation and Democratization 【片段】
Summary. — Anecdotal evidence from pre-modern Europe and North America suggests that rulers are forced to become more democratic once they impose a significant fiscal burden on their citizens. One difficulty in testing this “taxation causes democratization”hypothesis empirically is the endogeneity of public revenues. I use introductions of value added taxes and autonomous revenue authorities as sources of quasi-exogenous variation to identify the causal effect of the fiscal burden borne by citizens on democracy. The instrumental variables regressions with a panel of 122 countries over the period 1981–2008 suggest that revenues have on average
a mild positive effect on democracy
One defining feature of a state is its capacity to raise revenues. Whether a state is strong or weak, whether it is determined or yielding, even whether it survives or disintegrates depends ultimately on its balance sheet. Public finances are thus more than a purely economic phenomenon.Following Joseph Schumpeterrsquo;s conception of a fiscal sociology they are essential determinants of social and political developments, in fact “...public finances are one of the best
starting points for an investigation of society, especially but not exclusively of its political life”
The level and composition of public revenues, in particular,are likely to have a decisive influence on the character of the state. Rulers who depend on revenues from taxation will rule differently than rulers who rely on their own estates or on the exploitation of natural resources. Taxation implies a direct and noticeable transfer of resources from citizens to the state. Most
other revenue sources affect citizens less or not at all. Given this critical distinction between tax and non-tax revenues, it can be conjectured that rulers who impose a large fiscal burden on their
citizens must offer them in return a voice in policy making. Once citizens feel the fiscal weight of the state, they are less likely to tolerate an autocratic and unaccountable government.
Historical evidence appears to be consistent with this argument. There are several famous examples where attempts to increase taxation by autocratic rulers resulted in revolution and eventually more accountable government. During the early conflicts between Parliament and the Crown in England, the former rebelled against repeated attempts by the kings to expand taxation and simultaneously model the English state into an absolutist monarchy. The French Revolution began as a revolt against the large tax burden imposed by the Ancien Reacute;gime to fund its costly wars and sumptuous court life. The American Rebellion even had as its seminal demand that there should be no taxation without representation.
The “taxation causes democratization” hypothesis has recently reemerged in the context of development policies. 2According to some authors, improvements in the statersquo;s capacity to tax could lead to more democracy in developing countries (Di John, 2009; Moore, 2007). Yet while the case for the hypothesis appears strong in view of the historical evidence, it is ultimately based on a few admittedly dramatic but perhaps unrepresentative cases.
I study in this paper whether taxation has a casual effect on democracy with a panel dataset consisting of macroeconomic data for 122 countries over the period from 1981 to 2008. 3 As
sources of quasi-exogenous variation, I rely on two tax innovations that have seen wide-spread adoptions in the last three decades: the value added tax (VAT), and autonomous revenue authorities (ARA). I argue that countries adopted these two tax innovations primarily for fiscal and economic reasons,i.e., reasons unrelated to their level of democracy. Dummy variables indicating the year of their adoptions can therefore serve as quasi-exogenous instruments for levels of taxation
The closest methodological predecessor to this paper is the study by Keen and Lockwood (2010) on the causes and consequences of the introduction of value added taxes. These authors explore why countries adopt a VAT and whether revenues increase after the adoption. In terms of the research question, the closest precedent is Ross (2004) who studies the link between taxation and representation for a large panel of countries. However, since his results rely on pooled crosssection regressions, there remains doubt whether he has identified a causal effect. Subsequent contributions on the taxation–democracy link devote more attention to identification,but have a narrower geographical focus. Berger (2009) studies whether regional differences in the investment in administrative capacity by the British colonial authorities in Nigeria affect the contemporaneous quality of government. Baskaran and Bigsten (2013) investigate with panel data from 23 subSaharan Africa how fiscal capacity affects the quality of the government. McGuirk (2011) tests with micro-level public perception data from 15 sub-Saharan African countries whether natural resource rents incentivize rulers to reduce taxation,and whether this effect in turn diminishes the demand for democratic accountability.
Taxation: Effects and influences 【全文】
Abstract
Even if fiscal phenomenon is mainly public content, it directly influences besides the public and private sector. Module generates the settlement and collection of taxes from taxpayers targeted specific reactions, either undertakings or individuals. The purpose of this paper is to unravel the influence of taxation on taxpayers and tax effects on the economy arising from the phenomenon in general and individuals in their capacity as taxpayers. How fiscal phenomenon has a wide coverage and its influences are varied and can identified in the smallest details of the individual in social life and as a taxpayer, the actual
Taxation and Democratization 【片段】
税收与民主化
Summary. — Anecdotal evidence from pre-modern Europe and North America suggests that rulers are forced to become more democratic once they impose a significant fiscal burden on their citizens. One difficulty in testing this “taxation causes democratization”hypothesis empirically is the endogeneity of public revenues. I use introductions of value added taxes and autonomous revenue authorities as sources of quasi-exogenous variation to identify the causal effect of the fiscal burden borne by citizens on democracy. The instrumental variables regressions with a panel of 122 countries over the period 1981–2008 suggest that revenues have on average
a mild positive effect on democracy
摘要 ——来自前现代欧洲和北美的轶事证据表明，一旦统治者把沉重的财政负担强加给他们的公民，他们就会被迫变得更加民主。实证检验这种“税收导致民主化”假说的一个困难是公共收入的内生性。我使用增值税和自治税收当局作为准外生变异来源来介绍公民承担的财政负担对民主的因果影响。在1981—2008年间，122个国家的工具变量回归表明收入对民主的平均作用是温和的。
One defining feature of a state is its capacity to raise revenues. Whether a state is strong or weak, whether it is determined or yielding, even whether it survives or disintegrates depends ultimately on its balance sheet. Public finances are thus more than a purely economic phenomenon.Following Joseph Schumpeterrsquo;s conception of a fiscal sociology they are essential determinants of social and political developments, in fact “...public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of society, especially but not exclusively of its political life”
一个国家决定性特征之一就是它增加收入的能力。一个国家是强是弱，是决定还是屈服，甚至是生存还是解体，都取决于资产负债表。因此，公共财政不仅仅是一种纯粹的经济现象。按照Joseph Schumpeter的财政社会学概念，它们是社会和政治的基本决定因素。 事实上，他认为“公共财政是调查社会的最佳起点之一，特别是但不完全是社会政治生活的起点。
The level and composition of public revenues, in particular,are likely to have a decisive influence on the character of the state. Rulers who depend on revenues from taxation will rule differently than rulers who rely on their own estates or on the exploitation of natural resources. Taxation implies a direct and noticeable transfer of resources from citizens to the state. Most other revenue sources affect citizens less or not at all. Given this critical distinction between tax and non-tax revenues, it can be conjectured that rulers who impose a large fiscal burden on their citizens must offer them in return a voice in policy making. Once citizens feel the fiscal weight of the state, they are less likely to tolerate an autocratic and unaccountable government.
特别是公共收入的水平和构成很可能对国家的性质产生决定性的影响。依靠税收收入的统治者将不同于依靠自己的地产或开发自然资源的统治者。税收意味着资源从公民到国家的直接和明显的转移。大多数其他收入来源对公民的影响很少或根本没有。考虑到税收和非税收入之间的这一关键区别，可以推测，那些对他们的公民施加巨大财政负担的统治者必须为公民提供政策制定的声音。一旦公民感受到国家的财政负担，他们就不太可能容忍专制和不负责任的政府。
Historical evidence appears to be consistent with this argument. There are several famous examples where attempts to increase taxation by autocratic rulers resulted in revolution and eventually more accountable government. During the early conflicts between Parliament and the Crown in England, the former rebelled against repeated attempts by the kings to expand taxation and simultaneously model the English state into an absolutist monarchy. The French Revolution began as a revolt against the large tax burden imposed by the Ancien Reacute;gime to fund its costly wars and sumptuous court life. The American Rebellion even had as its seminal demand that there should be no taxation without representation.
历史证据似乎与这一论点一致。有几个著名的例子表明，独裁统治者增加税收的企图导致了革命，并最终导致了更负责任的政府。在议会与英国皇冠之间的早期冲突中，前者反对国王多次企图扩大税收，同时将英国国家模式化为专制君主政体。法国大革命开始是为了反抗古代政府征收的巨额税负，以资助其昂贵的战争和奢华的法庭生活。美国的叛乱甚至有其特有的要求，即没有代表权就不应该有税收。
The “taxation causes democratization” hypothesis has recently reemerged in the context of development policies. According to some authors, improvements in the statersquo;s capacity to tax could lead to more democracy in developing countries (Di John, 2009; Moore, 2007). Yet while the case for the hypothesis appears strong in view of the historical evidence, it is ultimately based on a few admittedly dramatic but perhaps unrepresentative cases.
“税收导致民主化”假说最近在发展政策中重新出现。据一些作者说，国家税收能力的提高可能导致发展中国家的更加民主(Di John，2009年；Moore，2007年)。然而，尽管从历史证据看，这一假说的论据似乎很有力，但它最终还是基于一些公认的有戏剧性但也许不具有代表性的情况。
I study in this paper whether taxation has a casual effect on democracy with a panel dataset consisting of macroeconomic data for 122 countries over the period from 1981 to 2008. As sources of quasi-exogenous variation, I rely on two tax innovations that have seen wide-spread adoptions in the last three decades: the value added tax (VAT), and autonomous revenue authorities (ARA). I argue that countries adopted these two tax innovations primarily for fiscal and economic reasons,i.e., reasons unrelated to their level of democracy. Dummy variables indicating the year of their adoptions can therefore serve as quasi-exogenous instruments for levels of taxation
本文以1981至2008年间122个国家的宏观经济数据为基础，研究税收是否对民主产生暂时性影响。作为准外源性变异的来源，我依赖于过去三年中广泛采用的两种税收创新：增值税（VAT）和自主税收当局（ARA）。我认为，国家采取这两个税收创新主要是由于财政和经济原因，即，原因与其民主水平无关。因此，指示收养年份的虚拟变量可以作为准外生的征税手段。
The closest methodological predecessor to this paper is the study by Keen and Lockwood (2010) on the causes and consequences of the introduction of value added taxes. These authors explore why countries adopt a VAT and whether revenues increase after the adoption. In terms of the research question, the closest precedent is Ross (2004) who studies the link between taxation and representation for a large panel of countries. However, since his results rely on pooled crosssection regressions, there remains doubt whether he has identified a causal effect. Subsequent contributions on the taxation–democracy link devote more attention to identification,but have a narrower geographical focus. Berger (2009) studies whether regional differences in the investment in administrative capacity by the British colonial authorities in Nigeria affect the contemporaneous quality of government. Baskaran and Bigsten (2013) investigate with panel
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