Brand Names
Consumers always have incomplete information about product availability, quality, and alternative prices. Such 'imperfect information' leads them to rely on brand names, which lessen the costs of acquiring product information. By relying on brand names and the company reputations associated with them, consumers can make reasonable purchases without searching or investigating products each time they buy.
Many economists have lamented the fact that consumers put so much reliance on brand names. The problem, as these economists see it, is that this consumer reliance gives companies with established brand names 'market power' over the price they can charge. When companies 'differentiate' their products with unique brand names and associated advertising and promotional campaigns, they can charge more than others for what these economists claim are 'truly' identical products. Brand names lead consumers to make what these economists consider to be artificial distinctions between different products. Companies with respected brand names, therefore, can increase prices without losing significant sales.
The claim that brand names lead to unnecessarily high prices is often based on a comparison between the real world and a world of 'perfect' consumer information, where every company in an industry is assumed to sell identical, unbranded ('homogeneous') products. These are the assumptions made in the model of 'perfect competition,' a simplifying construct sometimes employed by economists. Although imperfect information is completely natural and unavoidable, many economists find the unattainable ideal of perfect competition to be a desirable yardstick for policy. That is because under perfect competition no company has any power at all over the prices it charges. If a company raised its price even one cent above the market price, it would not sell anything. With perfect competition, therefore, no consumer would knowingly pay even one cent more for an identical product that could be obtained elsewhere at a lower price. Not surprisingly, the assumption that homogeneous products are the ideal leads to the incorrect implication that brand names that differentiate products decrease consumer welfare. That, in turn, leads to the policy, advocated by Harvard economist Edward H. Chamberlin in 1956, that trademarks should not be enforced.
More and more of the economics profession, however, has come to recognize the problem with assuming that brand name products are identical. One cannot understand the economic purpose served by brand names without dropping the assumption that we live in a world of perfect information where consumers are omniscient. Consumers, in fact, are not fully informed, and they know they are not. Therefore, they value company reputations—and they are willing to pay more for a product whose producer has a reputation for consistently supplying quality. By doing so, consumers are not acting irrationally. They are simply trying to protect themselves without having to devote huge amounts of time to learning all the details about each companys product. Reputations, and the brand names that go with them, are an efficient source of information for consumers.
Because consumers rely on and pay for reputations, companies have incentives to establish reputations by maintaining and improving the quality of their products. This incentive would be lost if all companies were required by law to sell indistinguishable, homogeneous products. If consumers could not identify the companies that produced the products they bought, individual companies would have no incentive to improve the quality of their products; in fact, each company would have an incentive to decrease the quality of its products. Economist Marshall Goldman has pointed out that this is exactly what occurred in the Soviet Union when brand names were eliminated after the 1917 communist revolution. That is why firms in the Soviet Union were required to identify their output with 'production marks.' When consumers cannot identify the company that produced what they buy, they have no recourse when they receive a product of low quality. Not only do consumers have no legal recourse, but more important, they have no economic recourse. Without brand names consumers do not know from current purchase experiences which products to buy—and which ones not to buy—in the future.
This repeat-purchase mechanism, where good past performance and a good reputation are rewarded with future profitable sales, and where poor performance is punished with the withdrawal of future profitable sales, provides companies with the incentive to perform in the marketplace. As a result, companies with superior reputations, representing good past performance and the likelihood of future profitable sales, have something to lose if they perform poorly. Their valuable brand names are a form of collateral that is at stake with every sale.
Consider, for example, the cost imposed upon Perrier in 1990 when it was discovered that the benzene used to clean its bottling machinery had contaminated some of its product. Perrier experienced a significant decrease in demand and had to spend large amounts of money on increased advertising, free samples, and other marketing and promotional expenditures in an attempt to recover its market share. Another recent newsworthy example was the image damage, lost sales, and greatly reduced profits suffered by Beech-Nut, the baby food company, when it was discovered in 1982 that its 'apple juice' consisted of water, sugar, and flavoring. If brand names were not present in these cases, the large economic punishment imposed on the nonperforming companies would have been lost.
Because companies with valuable brand names that fail to perform have more to lose than companies without valuable brand names, consumers who buy brand name products are necessarily paying for som
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品 牌
消费者总有关于产品可用性、质量和可供选择的价格的不完全信息。这样的“不完美的信息”导致他们依靠那些减轻获取产品信息的费用的品牌。由于依靠名牌和伴生的公司名誉，每次购买时，消费者没有搜寻或调查产品就能做出合理的购买。
许多经济学家惊叹这样一个事实：消费者在名牌上投入了如此的信赖。问题是， 如同这些经济学家看见的，消费者的信赖给了公司建立超出他们能收取的价格的品牌“市场力量”。因为这些经济学家宣称要“真实地”辨别产品，当公司以独特的名牌、相关的广告和积极的竞争来“区分”他们的产品，他们能够比其他人得到更多。 名牌引导消费者在不同的产品之间进行那些经济学家认为的人为的分别。公司因为品牌而受到尊敬，因此，名牌能使企业在提高价格的情况下而不会失去重大的销售额。
品牌导致消费者经常根据现实世界和“完美的”信息世界之间的比较而付出不必要的多余地的高价，那里同一个行业内的每个公司都承担出售相同的、没有品牌的“同类”产品。这些是在“完善的竞争模型，”作的假定，及有时供经济学家使用的简化的构建。虽然不完美信息是完全自然的和不可避免的。许多经济学家认为完善的竞争的绝佳状态是衡量政策是否理想的评判标准。那是因为在完善的竞争之下公司没有任何力量抬高交易价格。如果公司提高了他们的产品的价格甚至只比市场价格高一分，它都将什么也卖不出去。因此，在完全竞争情况下，消费者不会支付更高一分的价格购买在其他任何地方以更低的价格能买到的相同的产品。毫不奇怪，假定同类产品是理想的，导致以品牌区分产品而减少消费者福利的不正确涵义。那么，反过来，导致由哈佛经济学家爱德华·H 1956年主张的政策——商标不应该被强制执行。
但是，越来越多的经济行业认识到了假定产品是相同的存在着问题。你无法理解由没有下降的品牌效应为其服务的经济目的假定，我们居住在消费者都知晓的完全信息的世界。实际上，消费者没有充分的掌握信息，并且他们也知道他们并没有掌握完全的信息。因此，他们重视公司的名誉——并且他们愿意支付更多在那些一直供应高质量产品、拥有良好声誉的生产商的产品上。通过这种做法，消费者不会不合理行动。他们简单地设法保护自己没有必须用许多时间去学习获得关于各个公司的所有产品的细节。名牌与名誉相匹配是消费者高效率的做出购买决定的信息来源。
由于消费者依靠公司名誉并为此付钱，公司有不断提高和维护、改进他们的产品的质量建立公司声誉的热情。如果法律要求所有公司都销售不可分辨的同样的产品，这种激情就会消失。如果消费者不能辨认那些生产他们购买的产品的公司，各个不同的公司将不会有激情去提高、改进他们的产品质量；实际上，这样会导致各个公司降低他们产品的质量的热情。经济学家马歇尔・Goldman 指出，在苏联1917 年共产主义者革命以后，品牌被消灭，这种情况确实发生过。那就是为什么苏联的企业必须生产有“产品生产标记”的产品来区别他们的产品。当消费者无法辨认生产他们所购产品的公司时，他们接受低质量产品时不寻求法律帮助，但是，更加重要的是，他们没有经济求助。没有品牌，消费者不知道从当前的购买经验中获悉将来买哪个产品和不买哪个产品。
过去许多好的表现和好的名誉以未来获得巨大的销售来得到奖励，并且恶劣的表现以未来销售利润大跌而得到惩罚，这种重复的购买机制为公司提供了在市场上好好表现的激情。结果，公司以良好的名誉，代表过去优秀的表现和未来获得可观利润的可能，如果他们表现恶劣，将会失去某些东西。他们珍贵的品牌是每次销售成败的体现。考虑，例如，1990 年当Perrier 因为被发现过去经常清洗它装瓶的机械的苯沾染了一些他的产品而被强加成本。Perrier体验经历了需求巨额下滑，并且不得不花很多金钱用以增加广告投入、免费样品，并且其它营销和促销费用开支用于试图恢复它的市场份额。其它最近有价值的报导的例子是Beech-Nut儿童食品有限公司在1982年被发现它生产的“苹果汁”包括了水，糖和香料而遭受了形象损失、失去销售额和利润的巨大下滑。如果在这些情况中不存在品牌就不会有强加于表现不好的公司头上的严重的经济惩罚。
因为没有好好的表现，所以那些具有珍贵品牌的公司会比没有珍贵品牌的公司失去的更多，所以购买品牌产品的消费者有必要支付更多。他们在购买名牌公司的产品时，公司将有更多的热情服务和采取必要的措施在质量上保护它的名誉。例如，一个利润极高的公司如坎伯迪，以罐装汤的销售获得巨大的市场份额，如果在他的产品里发现腊肠毒菌比一个小规模的公司譬如Bon Vivant（1917年由于发现他的罐装汤里有腊肠毒菌导致一例死亡而破产）将会有更多丢失。十分清楚地，坎伯的比Bon Vivant 有一个更高的水平避免腊肠毒菌出现在它的产品里。当消费者购买品牌产品时，他们也是在购买增加的信心和可靠性。
罐头同样是被说成是一个“规范化”产品的购买，譬如阿斯匹灵，多数公司从同样的制造商那里购买基本的成份。如果消费者不是无知的或愚蠢的，当他们能以更低的价格购买到完全一样的没有品牌的产品时，为什么他们会买一个做过广告的品牌产品？答复就是，所有的阿斯匹灵的确并不是完全相同的。阿斯匹灵的化学工艺也并不都是等效的。装填物成份、溶化率和保质期也可能因品牌不同而不同。但更加重要的，高定价的品牌和较低价的“非品牌”的阿斯匹灵在经济上并不是等效的。实际上，对生产商和消费者来说产品有必要不同。
正如Perrier例子生动地说明，我们居住在即使是一个简单的产品也总有可能某些地方出错的一个不完美的世界。由于一个可贵的名牌的存在，公司出售品牌阿斯匹灵如果出现某些错误将会失去更多。因此，公司有一个更加巨大的经济动力刺激他们采取防备措施。这种增加的额外的质量保证是消费者购买品牌商标产品时他们知道应该支付更高价格的其中的一项。
然后，问题变成不是当消费者以支付更高的价格购买品牌商标产品时完全无知，而是他们为质量管理支付太多。所有消费者都会为名牌管理和品牌保证支付一些；这仅仅是消费者支付的横跨产品变化的数额。甚至说过“所有阿斯匹灵都是相似的” 人们也会花一些钱在品牌保证上。他们不买集会上卡车后面的“非品牌”阿斯匹灵。相反，他们也许购买“更低价格”的品牌阿斯匹灵，譬如阿斯匹灵连锁经营药房的品牌。进一步，在市场中 比起在成人段而言，消费者购买儿童段阿斯匹灵的“更低价格的”品牌阿斯匹灵中的一个更小的份额更严重。许多人决定，依照他们的行为来见证尽管他们愿意为他们自己购买较少品牌保证的产品，但是他们却想为孩子们购买更多质量的保证的产品。
最后，识别出即使是政府规定的产品质量标准的市场经营中的品牌是很重要的。明显的问题是：为什么不整个地依靠政府标准去保证公司的表现呢？这里有二个主要答复：首先，政府标准经常无法容易地获取一些表现的元素。例如，虽然政府给农产品规定等级，譬如蔬菜的颜色、大小等等，但是他们却无法定义和分级一些对消费者来说相当重要的特征，譬如口味。其次，估计和保证质量的政府机构是极欠完善的。例如，在1989 年粮食与药物管理局发现几个普通药物公司伪造了或修改了递交给粮食与药物管理局的测试结果并得到他们的药物批准，并且三名粮食与药物管理局雇员承认从这些普通公司收受礼物。所以为了保证他们所购买的产品的质量，消费者不仅依赖于正确的政府标准，而且依赖于品牌的做法是正确的。
Brand Names
Consumers always have incomplete information about product availability, quality, and alternative prices. Such 'imperfect information' leads them to rely on brand names, which lessen the costs of acquiring product information. By relying on brand names and the company reputations associated with them, consumers can make reasonable purchases without searching or investigating products each time they buy.
Many economists have lamented the fact that consumers put so much reliance on brand names. The problem, as these economists see it, is that this consumer reliance gives companies with established brand names 'market power' over the price they can charge. When companies 'differentiate' their products with unique brand names and associated advertising and promotional campaigns, they can charge more than others for what these economists claim are 'truly' identical products. Brand names lead consumers to make what these economists consider to be artificial distinctions between different products. Companies with respected brand names, therefore, can increase prices without losing significant sales.
The claim that brand names lead to unnecessarily high prices is often based on a comparison between the real world and a world of 'perfect' consumer information, where every company in an industry is assumed to sell identical, unbranded ('homogeneous') products. These are the assumptions made in the model of 'perfect competition,' a simplifying construct sometimes employed by economists. Although imperfect information is completely natural and unavoidable, many economists find the unattainable ideal of perfect competition to be a desirable yardstick for policy. That is because under perfect competition no company has any power at all over the prices it charges. If a company raised its price even one cent above the market price, it would not sell anything. With perfect competition, therefore, no consumer would knowingly pay even one cent more for an identical product that could be obtained elsewhere at a lower price. Not surprisingly, the assumption that homogeneous products are the ideal leads to the incorrect implication that brand names that differentiate products decrease consumer welfare. That, in turn, leads to the policy, advocated by Harvard economist Edward H. Chamberlin in 1956, that trademarks should not be enforced.
More and more of the economics profession, however, has come to recognize the problem with assuming that brand name products are identical. One cannot understand the economic purpose served by brand names without dropping the assumption that we live in a world of perfect information where consumers are omniscient. Consumers, in fact, are not fully informed, and they know they are not. Therefore, they value company reputations—and they are willing to pay more for
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