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题目 |
Accounting for government grants: Standard-setting and accounting choice |
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作者 |
Christian Stadlera, Christopher W. Nobes |
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刊名 |
journal of accounting and public of policy |
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来源数据库 |
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 37 (2018) 113–129 |
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关键词 |
Government grants IAS 20 Accounting choice International differences |
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原始语种摘要 |
This paper provides evidence on several matters relating to accounting for government grants under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Focusing on grants related to assets, we trace the development of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 20, outline some of the problems of current accounting practice, and suggest why these have not been addressed by the standard-setter. Then, by hand-collecting data relating to 559 firms from 15 countries, we em-pirically analyze several issues. We show that asset grants are economically important for some firms and that the frequency of grants is significantly different across the countries. For the non-financial firms in our sample, we identify the grant-related accounting policy choice: a firm can either show the grant as deferred income or net it against the asset. The options are roughly equally popular overall but the firmrsquo;s country of domicile is strongly associated with the choice. Further, as a key element of disclosure quality for this topic, we investigate whether or not the balance sheet-related numbers relating to grants are disclosed, finding that many firms do not disclose them. Disclosure quality is better for firms which use the lsquo;deferred incomersquo; option, and it is also better in countries where a higher proportion of firms has received government grants. International differences and poor disclosure are detrimental to international comparisons, so we conclude that the policy choice should be removed from the accounting standard. |
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原始语种正文 节选 |
5. Sample and data for empirical analyses Our choice of countries was explained in Section4.1. Our sample comprises the constituents of the major stock market indices of these countries, which gives an initial sample of 813firms. We then eliminate 98firms with foreign influence, 31 subsidiaries of listed domestic firms, and 35firms which do not use IFRS. We also eliminate 74firms for which we do not have data for our sample year, 2013 (see below). Finally, we eliminate 14firms for which the data on asset grants are unclear and 2 firms where the grant is said to be immaterial. This reduces our sample to 559 firms. Table 1 gives the detail of this sample selection. Table 2 shows the country and industry distribution. Industry is according to the first digit of the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) code. In our analyses, we use one observation per firm because our data (both policy choice and disclosure quality) are sticky over time. We use 2013/14 (hereafterlsquo;2013rsquo;) as our sample year, i.e. we use data for accounting periods ending on 31 December 2013 or earliest thereafter. All data related to government grants are hand-collected from firmsrsquo; annual reports and the remaining data are from Worldscope. Many firms do not use the term lsquo;government grantsrsquo; but use such terms as: investment grants, capital grants, construction grants, official grants, government subsidies, subsidies, investment subsidies, capital subsidies, government assistance and government incentives. We include these cases where it is clear that government grants for assets are involved. The policy choice is generally disclosed in the policy notes. However, for each firm, we check whether the policy note is in line with the respective number in other notes (if the number is disclosed). We identify two firms (DSME and OCI of South Korea) that have incorrect policy notes, in that they report use of the lsquo;deferred incomersquo; policy but the PPE notes show that the grants are netted from the assets. Table 3 includes data on the frequency of grants. Overall, 33% (185 out of 559) of the sample firms report asset grants. However, our sample includes 138financialfirms, and only 5 of them report asset grants. When we restrict our analysis to non-financial firms, we find that 43% (180 out of 421) report asset grants. In order to ensure that our tests (in particular of Hypothesis H3) are not affected by the proportion of financial firms in the national samples, we exclude financial firms from here on. 6. Policy choice 6.1. Univariate analysis Table 3 shows that, over all, IAS 20rsquo;s two options are nearly equally popular: 52% (94 out of 180) of firms with asset grants chose to present them as deferred income. However, there are obvious international differences: the proportion of firms choosing the deferred income option is highest in Australia and Brazil (100%) and lowest in Canada (0%) and South Korea (4%).Table 3 also reports that the international difference is significant at the 1% level (see the last line). The results on policy choice are generally in line with previous research. Based on a sample of 213 German and 224 UK non-financial firms for 2009, Haller and Wehrfritz (2013) found that 52% of German and 20% of UK firms received government grants, and that 36% of German and 82% of UK firms with grants used the lsquo;deferred incomersquo; option under IFRS. In our study, which is based on a very different sample, the respective percentages are 89% versus 13% (for receiving grants) and 32% versus 67% (for choosing lsquo;deferred incomersquo;). These results are in line with the general hypothesis of maintaining pre-IFRS practice when first adopting I 全文共26360字，剩余内容已隐藏，支付完成后下载完整资料
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