Finding The Metaphor
Such conjunctions reveal the mechanics of the traditional jokethat depends upon using the same word in two different senses atonce. A common way of treating them is to force the 'literal'meaning: to say, for example, that to smell of musk and 'MySin' is to smell of two different sorts of perfume, while to smell ofinsolence is not to be smelly at all. Moreover, just like the earliergiven set, these conjunctions reveal not only the presence of duality of sense but the presence of metaphor, one sense being literal,the other metaphorical. In which case such expressions as 'seeingthe point of a joke' and 'smelling of insolence' are metaphors.But this is to confuse the literal with the physical and to holdthat any non-physical sense is metaphorical. Originally the literalmay have been nothing but the physical. But it is not so now.There may be many literal senses, only some of which are physical.This seems to be the case here. While we are aware of the manysenses in which words like 'see,''general,' etc., may be used, wedo not usually consider that one of these senses—the physical—holds a monopoly of the literal sense, the others being figurative.Accordingly, it is more accurate to say that such conjunctions reveal the presence of duality of sense or sort-crossing but not necessarily the presence of metaphor.
It is harder to construct conjunctions producing the same effect with words in which the original -probably physical -sensehas been lost to all but classicists:
Comprehend the meaning
Perceive the table
Discourse upon logic
For the same reason it is harder to make metaphors with them.Nevertheless it is possible for the expressions just listed and forthose like 'see the point of the joke etc., treated above, to becomemetaphorical. Awareness of duality of meaning, as we have seen, isnot enough to do it. Neither my awareness of my ability to see thepoint of a needle at the same time as I say that I can see the pointof a joke, nor my awareness of my ability to detect the smell ofmusk at the same time as I say that he came into the room smellingof insolence, is enough to make my assertions metaphorical. Nor, if I am an etymologist, is my awareness of the gross original senseof “comprehend' at the same time as I say that I comprehend yourmeaning. In all these cases I am using words in one or other oftheir literal senses. I am representing the facts of one sort in wordsthat may be equally appropriate to the facts of another. Whatmore then is needed to make these expressions metaphorical?
The answer lies in the as iformake-believefeature alreadysketched and illustrated. When Descartes says that the worldis amachine or when I say with Seneca that man is a wolf, and neitherof us intends our assertions to be taken literally but only metaphorically, both of us are aware,first,that we are sort-crossing,that is, re-presenting the facts of one sort in the idioms appropriateto another, or, in other words, of the duality of sense. I say 'areaware,' but of course, we must be, otherwise there can be nometaphor. We are aware, secondly, that we are treating the worldand man as if they belong to new sorts. We are aware of the duality of sense in machine' and 'wolf,' but we make believe thateach has only one sense that there is no difference in kind, onlyin degree, between the giant clockwork of nature and the pygmyclockwork of my wrist watch, or between man-wolves and timber-wolves. It is as if the sentences
The world and this clock are machines
and
Men and timber-wolves are wolves
which we both know to be absurd, were meaningful and true. Inshort, the use of metaphor involves both the awareness of dualityof sense and the pretense that the two different senses are one. ToDr.Johnson#39;s remark that metaphor 'gives you two ideas forone,' we need to add that it gives you two ideal as one.
To encompass this new factor Aristotlersquo;s definition must therefore be expanded. Gilbert Ryle offers a still better definition ofmetaphor: 'It represents the facts. . . as if they belonged to onelogical type or category (or range of types of categories), whenthey actually belong to another.' This greatly illuminates thesubject of metaphor because it draws our attention to those two features that I have been stressing, namely sort-crossing or the fusion of different sorts, and the pretense or as if feature. I should again point out, however, that although this definition is about the best definition of metaphor known to me, it is not Ryle#39;s definition of metaphor at all. It is, indeed, his alternative definition of category-mistake or categorial confusion.
The definition of metaphor now arrived at is based on Aristotle#39;s. It improves his, first, by widening it to include as potential metaphors any signs possessing duality of meaning; and secondly, by narrowing it to differentiate metaphor from trope, thus satisfying the desideratum in Aristotle#39;s definition. Moreover, it saves his definition, which is basically correct, first, by retaining his notion that metaphor is the genus of which all the rest are species;and, secondly, by preserving the distinctions between metonymy,synecdoche, and catachresis. But, of course, none of these is properly a metaphor until the as if prescription is filled. All of them have the basic ingredient of sort-crossing Or duality of sense, and,to this extent, are all tropes. All of them, however, are potentially metaphors. Any trope can achieve full metaphorhood but only for that user who fuses the two senses by making believe there is only one sense. Thus to the plain man there may be no metaphor in Aristotle#39;s 'substance,' Descartes#39; 'machine of nature,' Newtonian 'force' and 'attraction,' Thomas Young#39;s 'kinetic energy,' and Michelangelo#39;s figure of Leda. Placed in their customary contexts these present to him nothing but the face o
Finding The Metaphor
Such conjunctions reveal the mechanics of the traditional joke that depends upon using the same word in two different senses at once. A common way of treating them is to force the 'literal' meaning: to say, for example, that to smell of musk and 'My Sin' is to smell of two different sorts of perfume, while to smell of insolence is not to be smelly at all. Moreover, just like the earlier given set, these conjunctions reveal not only the presence of duality of sense but the presence of metaphor, one sense being literal,the other metaphorical. In which case such expressions as 'seeing the point of a joke' and 'smelling of insolence' are metaphors.But this is to confuse the literal with the physical and to hold that any non-physical sense is metaphorical. Originally the literal may have been nothing but the physical. But it is not so now.There may be many literal senses, only some of which are physical.This seems to be the case here. While we are aware of the many senses in which words like 'see,' 'general,' etc., may be used, we do not usually consider that one of these senses—the physical—holds a monopoly of the literal sense, the others being figurative. Accordingly, it is more accurate to say that such conjunctions reveal the presence of duality of sense or sort-crossing but not necessarily the presence of metaphor.
It is harder to construct conjunctions producing the same effect with words in which the original -probably physical -sense has been lost to all but classicists:
Comprehend the meaning
Perceive the table
Discourse upon logic
For the same reason it is harder to make metaphors with them. Nevertheless it is possible for the expressions just listed and for those like 'see the point of the joke etc., treated above, to become metaphorical. Awareness of duality of meaning, as we have seen, is not enough to do it. Neither my awareness of my ability to see the point of a needle at the same time as I say that I can see the point of a joke, nor my awareness of my ability to detect the smell of musk at the same time as I say that he came into the room smelling of insolence, is enough to make my assertions metaphorical. Nor, if I am an etymologist, is my awareness of the gross original sense of “comprehend' at the same time as I say that I comprehend your meaning. In all these cases I am using words in one or other of their literal senses. I am representing the facts of one sort in words that may be equally appropriate to the facts of another. What more then is needed to make these expressions metaphorical?
The answer lies in the as if or make-believe feature already sketched and illustrated. When Descartes says that the world is a machine or when I say with Seneca that man is a wolf, and neither of us intends our assertions to be taken literally but only metaphorically, both of us are aware, first, that we are sort-crossing, that is, re-presenting the facts of one sort in the idioms appropriate to another, or, in other words, of the duality of sense. I say 'are aware,' but of course, we must be, otherwise there can be no metaphor. We are aware, secondly, that we are treating the world and man as if they belong to new sorts. We are aware of the duality of sense in machine' and 'wolf,' but we make believe that each has only one sense that there is no difference in kind, only in degree, between the giant clockwork of nature and the pygmy clockwork of my wrist watch, or between man-wolves and timber-wolves. It is as if the sentences
The world and this clock are machines
and
Men and timber-wolves are wolves
which we both know to be absurd, were meaningful and true. In short, the use of metaphor involves both the awareness of duality of sense and the pretense that the two different senses are one. To Dr.Johnson#39;s remark that metaphor 'gives you two ideas for one,' we need to add that it gives you two ideal as one.
To encompass this new factor Aristotlersquo;s definition must therefore be expanded. Gilbert Ryle offers a still better definition of metaphor: 'It represents the facts. . . as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types of categories), when they actually belong to another.' This greatly illuminates the subject of metaphor because it draws our attention to those two features that I have been stressing, namely sort-crossing or the fusion of different sorts, and the pretense or as if feature. I should again point out, however, that although this definition is about the best definition of metaphor known to me, it is not Ryle#39;s definition of metaphor at all. It is, indeed, his alternative definition of category-mistake or categorial confusion.
The definition of metaphor now arrived at is based on Aristotle#39;s. It improves his, first, by widening it to include as potential metaphors any signs possessing duality of meaning; and secondly, by narrowing it to differentiate metaphor from trope, thus satisfying the desideratum in Aristotle#39;s definition. Moreover, it saves his definition, which is basically correct, first, by retaining his notion that metaphor is the genus of which all the rest are species;and, secondly, by preserving the distinctions between metonymy,synecdoche, and catachresis. But, of course, none of these is properly a metaphor until the as if prescription is filled. All of them have the basic ingredient of sort-crossing Or duality of sense, and,to this extent, are all tropes. All of them, however, are potentially metaphors. Any trope can achieve full metaphorhood but only for that user who fuses the two senses by making believe there is only one sense. Thus to the plain man there may be no metaphor in Aristotle#39;s 'substance,' Descartes#39; 'machine of nature,' Newtonian 'force' and 'attraction,' Thomas Young#39;s 'kinetic energy,' and Michelangelo#39;s figure of Leda. Placed in their customary
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