外文原文
All the perceptions of the human mind fall into two distinct kinds, which I shall call lsquo;impressionsrsquo; and lsquo;ideasrsquo;. These differ in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind and make their way into our thought or consciousness. The perceptions that enter with most force and violence we may name lsquo;impressionsrsquo;; and under this name I bring all our sensations,passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul [= lsquo;mindrsquo;; no religious implications]. By lsquo;ideasrsquo; I mean the faint images of the others in thinking and reasoning: for example, all the perceptions aroused by your reading this book - apart from perceptions arising from sight and touch, and apart from the immediate pleasure or uneasiness your reading may cause in you. I donrsquo;t think I need to say much to explain this distinction: everyone will readily perceive for himself the difference between feeling (·impressions·) and thinking (·ideas·). The usual degrees ·of intensity· of these are easily distinguished, though there may be particular instances where they come close to one another. Thus, in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may become like our impressions; as on the other hand it sometimes happens that our impressions are so faint and low that we canrsquo;t distinguish them from our ideas. But although ideas and impressions are fairly similar in a few cases, they are in general so very different that no-one can hesitate to classify them as different and to give to each a special name to mark the difference. [In this work, lsquo;namersquo; is often used to cover not only proper names but also general terms such as lsquo;idearsquo;.]1
Another division of our perceptions should be noted; this one cuts across the line between impressions and ideas. It is the division into simple and complex. Simple perceptions - that is, simple impressions and ideas - are ones that donrsquo;t allow any distinction or separation ·among their parts·. Complex perceptions, on the contrary, can be distinguished into parts. Though a particular colour, taste, and smell, are qualities all united together in this apple, itrsquo;s easy to perceive that they arenrsquo;t the same as one another and can least be distinguished from each other - ·and so onersquo;s total perception of the apple is complex·.
Having through these divisions ordered and arranged our subject-matter (·perceptions·), we can now set ourselves to consider more accurately their qualities and relations. The first fact that springs to my attention is that our impressions greatly resemble our ideas in every respect except their degree of force and liveliness. Perceptions of one kind seem to be, in a way, reflections of perceptions of the other kind; so that all the perceptions of the mind do double duty, appearing both as impressions and as ideas. When I shut my eyes and think of my study, the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt ·when I was in my study·; every detail in one is to be found in the other. And I find the same resemblance and representation when I survey my other perceptions: ideas and impressions seem always to correspond to each other. This remarkable fact holds my attention for a moment.
Surveying the field more accurately, I find I have been swept along by how things first appeared to me, and that I must - with help from the simple/complex distinction - limit this general thesis that all our ideas and impressions are resembling. I observe that .many of our complex ideas never had impressions that corresponded to them: I can imagine a city such as the New Jerusalem, with golden pavements and ruby walls, though I never saw such a thing. And I observe that .many of our complex impressions are never exactly copied by ideas: I have seen Paris, but I canrsquo;t form an idea of that city that perfectly represents all its streets and houses in all their detail.
So I perceive that although there is in general a great resemblance between our .complex impressions and ideas, it is not true across the board that they are exact copies of each other. Now let us consider how the case stands with our .simple perceptions. After the most accurate examination I am capable of, I venture to say that here the rule holds without exception: that every simple idea has a simple impression that resembles it, and every simple impression has a corresponding idea. The idea of red that we form in the dark differs only in .degree ·of intensity·,not in .nature, from the impression ·of red· that strikes our eyes in sunshine. You can satisfy yourself that I am right about this by going over as many of your simple impressions and ideas as you like; itrsquo;s impossible to prove my point by going over all of them! But if anyone should deny this universal resemblance ·between simple impressions and simple ideas·, I donrsquo;t know how to convince him except by asking him to show .a simple impression that doesnrsquo;t have a corresponding idea, or .a simple idea that has no corresponding impression. If he doesnrsquo;t answer this challenge - and itrsquo;s certain that he canrsquo;t - then his silence and our own observation will suffice to establish our conclusion.
Thus we find that all simpleideas and impressions resemble each other; and as the complex are formed from simple ones we can say generally that these two sorts of perception exactly correspond. Having uncovered this relation, which requires no further examination, I am curious to find some of the other qualities ·of impressions and ideas·. Let us consider what brings them into existence: as between impressions and ideas, which are causes and which are effects?
The full examination of this question is the subject of this book; so I shall here content myself with establishing one general proposition:
All our simple ideas, when they first appear, are derived from simple impressions
which correspond to them and which they exactly represent. In looking for p
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人性论
All the perceptions of the human mind fall into two distinct kinds, which I shall call lsquo;impressionsrsquo; and lsquo;ideasrsquo;. These differ in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind and make their way into our thought or consciousness. The perceptions that enter with most force and violence we may name lsquo;impressionsrsquo;; and under this name I bring all our sensations,passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul [= lsquo;mindrsquo;; no religious implications]. By lsquo;ideasrsquo; I mean the faint images of the others in thinking and reasoning: for example, all the perceptions aroused by your reading this book - apart from perceptions arising from sight and touch, and apart from the immediate pleasure or uneasiness your reading may cause in you. I donrsquo;t think I need to say much to explain this distinction: everyone will readily perceive for himself the difference between feeling (·impressions·) and thinking (·ideas·). The usual degrees ·of intensity· of these are easily distinguished, though there may be particular instances where they come close to one another. Thus, in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may become like our impressions; as on the other hand it sometimes happens that our impressions are so faint and low that we canrsquo;t distinguish them from our ideas. But although ideas and impressions are fairly similar in a few cases, they are in general so very different that no-one can hesitate to classify them as different and to give to each a special name to mark the difference. [In this work, lsquo;namersquo; is often used to cover not only proper names but also general terms such as lsquo;idearsquo;.]1
Another division of our perceptions should be noted; this one cuts across the line between impressions and ideas. It is the division into simple and complex. Simple perceptions - that is, simple impressions and ideas - are ones that donrsquo;t allow any distinction or separation ·among their parts·. Complex perceptions, on the contrary, can be distinguished into parts. Though a particular colour, taste, and smell, are qualities all united together in this apple, itrsquo;s easy to perceive that they arenrsquo;t the same as one another and can least be distinguished from each other - ·and so onersquo;s total perception of the apple is complex·.
Having through these divisions ordered and arranged our subject-matter (·perceptions·), we can now set ourselves to consider more accurately their qualities and relations. The first fact that springs to my attention is that our impressions greatly resemble our ideas in every respect except their degree of force and liveliness. Perceptions of one kind seem to be, in a way, reflections of perceptions of the other kind; so that all the perceptions of the mind do double duty, appearing both as impressions and as ideas. When I shut my eyes and think of my study, the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt ·when I was in my study·; every detail in one is to be found in the other. And I find the same resemblance and representation when I survey my other perceptions: ideas and impressions seem always to correspond to each other. This remarkable fact holds my attention for a moment.
Surveying the field more accurately, I find I have been swept along by how things first appeared to me, and that I must - with help from the simple/complex distinction - limit this general thesis that all our ideas and impressions are resembling. I observe that .many of our complex ideas never had impressions that corresponded to them: I can imagine a city such as the New Jerusalem, with golden pavements and ruby walls, though I never saw such a thing. And I observe that .many of our complex impressions are never exactly copied by ideas: I have seen Paris, but I canrsquo;t form an idea of that city that perfectly represents all its streets and houses in all their detail.
So I perceive that although there is in general a great resemblance between our .complex impressions and ideas, it is not true across the board that they are exact copies of each other. Now let us consider how the case stands with our .simple perceptions. After the most accurate examination I am capable of, I venture to say that here the rule holds without exception: that every simple idea has a simple impression that resembles it, and every simple impression has a corresponding idea. The idea of red that we form in the dark differs only in .degree ·of intensity·,not in .nature, from the impression ·of red· that strikes our eyes in sunshine. You can satisfy yourself that I am right about this by going over as many of your simple impressions and ideas as you like; itrsquo;s impossible to prove my point by going over all of them! But if anyone should deny this universal resemblance ·between simple impressions and simple ideas·, I donrsquo;t know how to convince him except by asking him to show .a simple impression that doesnrsquo;t have a corresponding idea, or .a simple idea that has no corresponding impression. If he doesnrsquo;t answer this challenge - and itrsquo;s certain that he canrsquo;t - then his silence and our own observation will suffice to establish our conclusion.
Thus we find that all simpleideas and impressions resemble each other; and as the complex are formed from simple ones we can say generally that these two sorts of perception exactly correspond. Having uncovered this relation, which requires no further examination, I am curious to find some of the other qualities ·of impressions and ideas·. Let us consider what brings them into existence: as between impressions and ideas, which are causes and which are effects?
The full examination of this question is the subject of this book; so I shall here content myself with establishing one general proposition:
All our simple ideas, when they first appear, are derived from simple impressions
which correspond to them and which they exactly represent. In looking for ph
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